

Problems in Predicting the Ecological Effects of Elevated CO₂

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I. Introduction

The rising level of atmospheric CO₂ is a major global anthropogenic change that we can track and predict with great confidence. We know that atmospheric CO₂ has increased, and we can make relatively good predictions of the levels we can expect to see in the near future. But the ecological effects of this rising CO₂ are not as easy to predict, and this is exactly what scientists are being asked to do by policy makers. Indeed, from the policy makers' point of view, the need for predictions of global change is the *raison d'être* for research on elevated CO₂. How good is our ability to make reasonable predictions, and how can we best improve such predictions? Most would agree that the answer to the first question is "not very good" at this point in time. This makes the second question even more important. The difficulty in making predictions of the ecological effects of rising CO₂ levels stems from two basic problems. First, ecology is a young science that does not have a body of widely accepted theory applicable to the questions of global change. There is no short-term solution to this problem, and the longer term solution is to promote the development of the science of ecology. As I will argue later in this chapter, research on the effects of elevated CO₂ can perhaps make a significant contribution to this longer-term goal.

The second major problem in making reliable predictions about the ecological effects of elevated CO₂ is that while scientists are being asked

to make predictions at the community, ecosystem, and biosphere level, most of the available information exists at lower levels (Körner, 1993). Figure 1 shows the traditional hierarchy of the levels of organization in biology, although the point here would apply to alternative hierarchical schemes (e.g., O'Neill *et al.*, 1986) as well. The predictions that are most needed concerning the effects of elevated CO₂ are at the top three levels, but most of our information about the effects of CO₂ are from experiments conducted at lower levels. For example, there are numerous experiments looking at the effects of elevated CO₂ on leaf-level photosynthesis, whole growth, and development of individual plants (see reviews by Bazzaz [1990], Mooney *et al.* [1991], and Woodward *et al.* [1991]), but because of costs and logistical constraints, we are just beginning to see longer-term experiments on populations and communities in the field.

One solution that has been proposed to this problem of making predictions at higher levels of organization is scaling up from the lower levels (Ehleringer and Field, 1993). But what exactly does "scaling up" mean? I find two very different meanings of this term in recent literature:

- (1) Extrapolation within one level of organization; or
- (2) Actual prediction of higher level phenomena using information from a lower level.

I will discuss them both in turn.

II. Extrapolation

Extrapolation usually means simply extending a quantitative relationship beyond the range of the data on which the relationship is based. Extrapolation is certainly possible and reasonable in many cases. For example, if one




Figure 1 Levels of organization in biology.

could accurately measure NPP in many randomly placed 1-m² quadrats within a grassland, one can extrapolate to get a good estimate of NPP over a larger area. The issues here are purely practical, not scientific. Extrapolating a specific quantitative relationship entails much more risk, as can be seen clearly in a simple example from population growth. Figure 2 shows a simple computer-generated logistic growth curve with random normal noise added.

If we have data from only one part of the curve, we would not be able to extrapolate very successfully, because we would not have any information on the overall shape of the relationship. If we have information only from the beginning of the curve, we would be inclined to conclude that growth is exponential (geometric growth). If we have information on the central part of the curve, growth would appear to be approximately linear (arithmetic growth). If we have data on the right-hand part of the curve, we would likely conclude that the growth rate is continuously decreasing, such as in a simple saturating function. Extrapolating any of these trends to the other regions of the curve would lead to major errors. One needs either data over the whole range of the relationship, or huge sample sizes to provide the statistical power to see subtle changes in the derivatives over smaller ranges. As another general example of this problem, one can point to the development and use of systems analysis models in ecosystem ecology (Patten, 1983). These “black box” models are often developed to predict some specific ecosystem processes, and calibrated using empirical data. Such models are often pretty good at predicting new combinations of variables within the range of the data used to calibrate them, but these same models are often very poor at making predictions outside the range of the data with which they are calibrated. The reason is similar to the




Figure 2 Logistic growth curve with random normal variation.

example of the logistic growth curve: the characterization of quantitative relationships is usually good enough for interpolating within the range of the calibrating data, but this characterization is not good enough to make predictions far beyond the range of the data. The same issue arises in statistical models.

In conclusion, extrapolation can be dangerous, but it is certainly possible and reasonable in some cases. It is important to note, however, that extrapolation does not usually involve a change in the level of organization in question. Rather, it usually refers to questions of scale within one level of organization.

III. Reductionism from Below

I call the second meaning of scaling up which I found in the literature “reductionism from below,” meaning the actual prediction of higher level phenomena from lower level information. I call it “from below” because reductionism is usually from above, i.e. it starts with the higher level phenomenon. In scaling up our starting point is information at the lower level. It is my contention here that this type of scaling up generally fails. For example, there is no basis for assuming that responses of a system to an environmental factor at a higher level of organization will be similar to responses at a lower level, and this has been documented in elevated CO₂ research (Reynolds and Acock, 1985; Reynolds *et al.*, 1993). Short-term regulatory responses of leaves to elevated CO₂ (i.e., an increase in the rate of photosynthesis) does not predict whole-plant biomass accumulation or acclimatory responses (Mooney and Koch, 1994). On the contrary, acclimatory responses often damp out regulatory response (Bazzaz, 1990). Similarly, the performance of plants grown singly at elevated CO₂ may not be a good predictor of their performance when competing. (Bazzaz and Garbutt, 1988; Bazzaz and McConnaughay, 1992).

Evolutionary responses to elevated CO₂, which we have a strong basis to expect (see Chapters 1–5), present the most difficult problems for prediction. There is no basis for assuming that the plastic response of an organism to an environmental factor will be similar or even in the same general direction as evolutionary responses to that same factor. For example, a plant may respond to shade by etiolating, but natural selection may favor slower growth and shorter stature in the shade (as we see in understory herbs). Similarly, Woodward (1987) presented evidence that plants respond to increasing CO₂ by decreasing the number of stomata (although this conclusion has been disputed [Körner, 1988]). Even if we assume that plants do develop fewer stomata in a CO₂-enriched environment, I see no *prima facie* reason why we should expect evolutionary responses to be in

the same direction. Simply put, evolutionary responses may damp out effects of elevated CO₂ (as populations evolve in an environment of elevated CO₂), or evolutionary responses may amplify short-term effects, as competitive relationships are altered and species evolve in different ways. There is no way to predict the long-term outcome at this point.

The problems of scaling up are not limited to evolutionary change. For example, CO₂ is a resource, and there has been significant progress in theories of resource utilization and limitation (Tilman, 1986; Bloom *et al.*, 1985; Chapter 28). These theories could provide some reasonable predictions concerning the effects of elevated CO₂ as a resource. Evidence is accumulating, however, that developmental effects of CO₂ on plants (e.g., Reekie and Bazzaz, 1991; Loehle, 1995) may be more important than resource-mediated effects. Since elevated CO₂ is a novel environment, developmental effects will not be predictable. Several species seem to show increased reproductive output in high CO₂ environments, but other species, e.g., *Abutilon*, *Cucumis*, show the opposite response (Bazzaz *et al.*, 1995). There is no way to predict with any confidence the response of reproductive output or allocation to elevated CO₂ in any species until we do the appropriate experiments.

As Körner (1993) has pointed out, there is no way that we can now, or will be able in the foreseeable future, to predict ecosystem processes from the physiological properties of organisms. To make the philosophical point that phenomena at any level of organization are ultimately reducible to and driven by phenomena at lower levels, does not mean that we are anywhere near being able to do this. Numerous ecologists (e.g., Allen and Starr, 1982; O'Neill *et al.*, 1986) have argued that pure reductionism in ecology will usually fail. If such reductionism were possible we should all be molecular biologists, or physical chemists, not ecologists. Levin (1993) suggested there may be laws for scaling up, but even if this is so, we are at present very far from discovering and applying them.

The paradigm for scaling up in biology has been the use of biochemistry in medicine: antibiotics are molecules that kill bacteria in a test tube, then scale up to cure disease at whole-body level, and then scale up to control epidemics at the population level. However, this type of successful scaling up has proven to be the exception, not the rule. The success of this example of scaling up may be because it takes place mostly within individuals, and the individual is the product of natural selection. Scaling up to supraorganismal levels, such as the community or ecosystem, operates under no such constraints.

Confidence in our ability to scale up depends on the available data and our theoretical understanding of the relationships between the levels of organization over which we are scaling (O'Neill *et al.*, 1986). The important argument against scaling up is not philosophical, but depends on the

available data and state of the art. If, in the scores of experiments that have been done on the effect of elevated CO₂, we did observe simple transparent reductionism, it would be quite reasonable to apply this in predicting CO₂ effects. For example, if increased CO₂ almost always resulted in increased photosynthesis at the leaf level, and increased biomass accumulation at the whole plant, population, and community levels, we would have a strong basis for applying this prediction generally. But CO₂ research has not yielded such general and simple patterns. As Bazzaz (1990) has pointed out, competitive outcomes will be modified by CO₂ and by the interaction of CO₂ with other environmental factors as different species behave differently in a high CO₂ world, and their response will depend on the identity of the competing species.

We cannot predict the behavior of a system from a lower level without either (1) evidence for such simple patterns across several levels, or (2) a well-developed theory that spans the levels in question. The data we have does not support (1), and (2) would require a level of ecological theory far beyond what we have available today or in the foreseeable future. The effects of CO₂ on terrestrial ecosystem will ultimately be reducible to physiology and interactions among individuals and their environments. But when, as in ecology, we do not have a very good understanding of the processes in question, scaling up from a lower level of organizations is much less reliable than predictions based on data from the same level as the phenomena to be predicted.

IV. Two Approaches to Research on Elevated CO₂

In light of this, we can distinguish two basic types of studies on the effects of elevated CO₂ on plants.

- (1) Reductionist experiments which study the mechanisms of CO₂ effects; and
- (2) Holistic experiments which look at CO₂ effects on whole systems that are as similar as possible to those about which we are trying to make predictions.

These two classes of experiments represent two legitimate, but in many cases fundamentally different, scientific goals. Scientific understanding is ultimately based on reductionism and mechanism, but the best currently accessible predictions of many phenomena often come from nonmechanistic, holistic “calculation tools” (*sensu* Loehle, 1983; see also Peters, 1991). To argue that one of these two scientific goals is better or more important than the other misses the point—they represent different goals, although this is not to say that they do not interact. Both can have integrity and

scientific validity (and both can be done poorly). I am suggesting that, over the short term, there is often a trade-off between these two goals.

As an example of mechanistic research on the effects of CO₂ I refer to an experiment that has been proposed (Bazzaz *et al.*, 1995; Körner, pers. comm.) on the effect of elevated CO₂ on the process of self-thinning (density-dependent mortality) in plant populations. Such an experiment could provide valuable data on the interaction between resource levels and density-dependent mortality. It might even provide insights into the mechanisms of density-dependent mortality beyond questions concerning CO₂. Such an experiment, if done reasonably well, would be very worthwhile scientifically. But I believe such an experiment would be practically useless in the near term in helping us to predict the effects of elevated CO₂ on terrestrial ecosystems that we will be seeing in the coming decades. Similarly, an experiment in which we enrich a whole-plant community with CO₂ for as long as possible will probably be much more valuable for predicting what will happen in the coming years, but it will probably not be very useful in showing us the mechanisms by which these changes occur. I call this latter type of experiment “brute-force empiricism.”

Much of modern medicine is based on such brute-force empiricism. We know a treatment works, but we often do not know the mechanism. Would one be willing to take a drug based purely on the data from *in vitro* studies and chemical theories? No, the principles of public health require that clinical trials be performed. If clinical trials are not possible, we want experiments on animals similar to humans. Similarly, if we're going to predict effects of elevated CO₂ on terrestrial ecosystems, the best type of data will be from experiments, natural or planned, which are as close to the thing we're trying to predict as is possible. But the clinical trial of a new medicine whose mechanism of action is not known will probably not provide useful information on the mechanism. It will merely tell us if the medicine works in a specific population.

The only reliable predictions possible for complex phenomena of which we have very limited understanding come from brute-force empiricism and, when necessary, extrapolation. To make a reliable prediction in such a case, one should study the phenomenon itself, or a system as similar to it as possible. In young sciences such as ecology and environmental science, data are more trustworthy than theory in making predictions (Peters, 1991; Weiner, 1995).

How are we able to predict the effects of specific treatments other than elevated CO₂ on terrestrial plant communities? For example, we know from experience that increasing the nutrients in many nutrient-poor plant communities will result in increased biomass and a reduction in species diversity. But we know this from experience—the experiment has been conducted many times. The theories that we have at this point to explain

why this occurs are still after-the-fact explanations; they are not really the basis for our prediction that when we add phosphorous to an oligotrophic lake, we will get a huge increase in algal growth and a concurrent decrease in algal diversity. Similarly if we are asked to make a prediction of the effects of building a highway on local populations of plant and animals, the most useful type of information would be the effects of other road-building projects on other communities, not deductions from ecological theories. Although such experiments have been done many times, the experiment of elevated CO₂ is being done for the first time.

The challenges presented by global change are before us.

Predicting and analyzing the structure and function of ecological systems on large spatial and long temporal scales are research challenges of rare potential but daunting difficulty. The potential derives from both *practical need* and *scientific opportunity*. The difficulty reflects the diversity and non linearity of ecological responses. (Ehleringer and Field, 1993; emphasis mine)

The dichotomy I have described fits Ehleringer and Field's eloquent diagnosis (Figure 3). Fundamental mechanistic research on effects of elevated CO₂ can and should be justified on its own terms, and it will eventually contribute to our understanding and prediction of global change, but it cannot be justified in terms of predicting global change in the near term. But if the goal is *merely* obtaining the best prediction of change in terrestrial systems *as soon as possible*, my claim is that an imperfect experiment at the level of organization we want to predict will be better than a perfectly designed experiment at a much lower level. According to this argument, the following studies are most likely to yield reasonable predictions in the near future:

(1) The study of naturally occurring communities of high CO₂, e.g., volcanic vents in Italy (Miglietta and Raschi, 1993; Miglietta *et al.*, 1993; Körner and Miglietta, 1994), Java (von Faber, 1925), and California (Koch, 1993). According to the arguments advanced above, despite the limitations of such studies (e.g., possible confounding factors such as other contaminating gases, limited replication, etc.), they probably represent the best available information we have for predicting effects of elevated CO₂ on communities and ecosystems. This is because such studies are perhaps the only ones that are at the appropriate level temporally. I believe the potential value of comparative studies on naturally-occurring high CO₂ communities, in comparison with experimental studies, has been greatly underestimated by researchers.

(2) Whole community experiments with elevated CO₂, as realistic and long term as possible (e.g., open-top chambers, FACE experiments)

(3) Microcosm versions of (2).

objective	method
to understand mechanisms of CO ₂ effects ("scientific opportunity")	reductionist experiments on single factors and combinations
to make predictions of CO ₂ effects as soon as possible ("practical need")	holistic experiments, both natural and planned

Figure 3 Two basic types of research on effects of elevated CO₂.

(4) Paleological evidence of community changes correlated with changes in CO₂. If it can be established that CO₂ levels were much higher in the Cretaceous, paleological data on terrestrial plant communities could be of value. Even information on terrestrial systems during periods of lower CO₂ over the past 100,000 years may be useful via extrapolation.

V. Prediction and Uncertainty

Some of the controversies concerning predictions of global change may result from the two very different uses of the word "prediction" in science. A hypothesis is a prediction: a claim about the behavior of the world based on a theory or model. Hypotheses are one of our most important research tools. Many of the most exciting and important hypotheses in science are controversial. But the word "prediction" is also used to describe consensus expectations from the scientific and engineering communities on which extra-scientific decisions can and should be based. Although the rising levels of CO₂ are predictions in this latter sense, even the best of our predictions about the ecological effects of rising CO₂ are only hypotheses, part of the research program in global change, but not yet firm bases for policy decisions.

It has been said many times that as science progresses we answer questions, but we often raise more questions than we answer. Perhaps one of the most important things we have learned from CO₂ research over the past decade is that things are not as simple as we might have hoped, that we do not know very much, that it will not be easy to make predictions about global effects. Ecology as a science is not yet developed enough to produce the predictions we are being asked to make. We must resist the temptation to confuse the importance of an issue with our ability to understand it. Questions concerning the ecological effects of anthropogenic environmental changes such as elevated CO₂ are perhaps among the most

important scientific questions facing the world today, but it does not follow that we have or soon will have the means to answer them. Policy makers want predictions, and they give scientists grants to produce such predictions. I do not think ecology will be well served if we claim to understand more than we do. Rather we are obliged to communicate to policy makers the concept of uncertainty with which they seem so uncomfortable. But if we can use the opportunity presented by global changes such as elevated CO₂ to do the fundamental ecological research needed to develop a scientific understanding of the processes involved, we can bring scientific opportunity and practical need together in a way that will further both our science and our public responsibility.

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